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HARE'S CRITICISM OF NATURALISM

by



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ABSTRACT

In section I we examine Hare's criticism of naturalism and see that it operates thus. The word 'good' is used to commend, to commend is to guide action, to guide action is to tell or advise somebody to do something not to get or persuade him to do it, only imperative sentences can tell someone to do something, therefore to guide action a word must have one or more imperatives as part of its meaning, imperatives do not follow from, nor can be analysed into, indicatives: naturalism claims that 'good' is a descriptive word attributing properties to things, we attribute properties to things by using indicative sentences: thus if naturalism is true the word 'good' cannot be used to guide action, as it obviously is used to guide action, naturalism must be wrong. We see that if it could be shown that imperative sentences are not the only things that can tell people to do things, or if it could be shown that imperatives do follow from and can be analysed into indicatives, then the thread of the argument will be broken and Hare's criticism of naturalism fail.

In section II we see that indicative sentences such as "The building is on fire" are used in certain contexts to tell people to do things.

In section III we examine and reject Hare's criticism

of the theory that imperatives may be analysed in terms of 'want' statements, and of the theory put forward by H G Bohnert. We then examine Hare's claim that hypothetical imperatives, although they seem to show us a case of imperatives being derived from indicatives, do not do so really. This claim is found to turn on a certain view about how the word 'want' should be analysed, which we investigate and reject. As a result of finding out what wanting really is, we are able to advance a theory about the correct analysis of imperatives which says that they may be analysed into expressions closely similar to those which Bohnert suggests, but of which a 'want' statement is an essential part. This theory not only allows us to analyse an imperative into an expression which exhibits the characteristic which Hare uses as the criterion of an imperative but also makes this expression indicative in mood.

In section IV we point out that these findings entail the failure of Hare's criticism of naturalism.

I

In chapter five of the Language of Morals, Hare brings an argument against ethical naturalism which runs in the following manner.

He chooses an example in which good pictures are those admired by the members of the Royal Academy, and in which the naturalist definition of good is drawn from this, so that the naturalist says that "Good picture" means "Picture admired by members of the Royal Academy".

Then he says:-

"If therefore we wish to say that the members of the Royal Academy have good taste in pictures, we have, according to the definition to say something which means the same as saying that they have this feeling of admiration for pictures which have a tendency to arouse in them this feeling."

(L.M. II.5.4. Para 2)

We can see from the way that he stresses the tautological nature of the "something" we have to say that he does not think it is a correct translation of "The members of the Royal Academy have good taste in pictures". He thinks it is not correct because something which we do mean

when we say this latter sentence has been left out, so that if naturalism and its definition are true we cannot mean this something by saying "The members of the Royal Academy have good taste in pictures". That Hare thinks this can be seen by:-

"Now this is not what we wanted to say. We wanted to say that they admired good pictures; we have succeeded only in saying that they admired pictures which they admired. Thus if we accept the definition we debar ourselves from saying something that we do sometimes want to say."

(L.M. II.5.4. Para 3)

After this he goes on to say what this thing that has been left out is:-

"What this something is will become apparent later; for the moment let us say that what we wanted to do was to commend the pictures which the members of the Royal Academy admired. Something about our definition prevented our doing this. We could no longer commend the pictures which they admired, we could only say that they admired those pictures which they admired. Thus our definition has prevented us, in one crucial case, from commending something which we want to commend, that is what is wrong with it."

(L.M. II.5.4. Para 3)

So we can see that Hare thinks that the naturalist translation of "The members of the Royal Academy have good taste in pictures" is incorrect because it does not include a translation of the commendation which that sentence carries.

This case is a "crucial case" because the criticism of naturalism in this example is such that it could be brought against any naturalist definition, as Hare goes on to explain:-

"It is important to realise that this difficulty has nothing to do with the particular example I have chosen. It is not because we have chosen the wrong defining characteristics; it is because, whatever defining characteristics we choose, this objection arises, that we can no longer commend an object for possessing those characteristics."

(L.M. II.5.4. Para 4)

Thus we can see what Hare's criticism of naturalism is on a general level. It is that naturalism cannot account for certain commending uses of the word 'good'; it cannot account for the commendation that the word 'good' does of an object possessing certain properties; the properties in virtue of which the word 'good' is applied to that object. That is to say, Hare thinks naturalism is incorrect because if it were true we couldn't use the word 'good' to commend with.

However, for naturalism to be wrong on this count, it has to be the case that we do use the word 'good' to commend. Can it be clearly seen that we do? Also, for Hare to believe that his example demonstrates the inadequacy of naturalism to account for the commending use of 'good' in the way shown, he has to believe, as well, that the commendation which 'good' carries must be a part of its conceptual meaning, for if he doesn't believe this, then the naturalist could reply to Hare's criticism by saying: "But why should I account for the commendation that the word 'good' carries, in a translation of its conceptual meaning? As the nature of commendation is such that it is compatible with not being contained in the conceptual meaning of 'good', to fail to place it there doesn't show that I can't account for it.". Must commendation belong to the conceptual meaning of 'good'?

The answers to both these questions depend on what the nature of commending is, so let us investigate this. Hare says:-

"We have therefore to inquire what commending is. When we commend or condemn anything, it is always in order, at least indirectly, to guide choices, our own or other people's, now or in the future."

(L.M. II.8.1. Para 1)

If we accept this, we can answer our first question for it can be clearly seen that we might say to a friend

wondering which car to buy "x is a good car" by way of guiding his choice. So we do use the word 'good' to commend. However we can't answer the second yet.

What is it to guide choices? Hare says:-

"To guide choices or actions, a moral judgement has to be such that if a person assents to it, he must assent to some imperative sentence derivable from it: in other words, if a person does not assent to some imperative sentence, that is knock-down evidence that he does not assent to the moral judgement in the evaluative sense Thus to say that moral judgements guide actions, and to say that they entail imperatives comes to much the same thing."

(L.M. III.11.3. p 171 Para 3)

So to guide choices is to entail imperatives.

Our examination of commending cannot yet be regarded as complete because we still have the problematic term 'imperative' in the analysis. What is an imperative? Hare characterises it in this passage:-

"Now this should give us a clue to the essential difference between statements and commands; it lies in what is involved in assenting to them;

If we assent to a statement we are said to be

sincere in our assent if and only if we believe that it is true (believe what the speaker has said). If on the other hand, we assent to a second person command addressed to ourselves, we are said to be sincere in our assent if and only if we do or resolve to do what the speaker has told us to do; if we do not do it but only resolve to do it later, then if, when the occasion arises for doing it, we do not do it, we are said to have changed our mind."

(L.M. I.2.2. Paras 2 & 3 pp 19 & 20)

Thus an imperative is a speech act to which sincere assent necessarily involves the forming of an intention or resolution.

There are also two further important properties which Hare considers such speech acts to have. Firstly, they cannot be entailed by, or follow from, solely indicative premises: he says:-

"Let me first state two of the rules that seem to govern this matter; we may leave till later the question of their justification. The rules are:

(1)

(2) No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premisses which does not contain at least one imperative."

(L.M. I.2.5. Para 2 p 28)

Secondly, the function of imperatives is not to affect a person's behaviour causally; that is, imperatives tell people to do things, they don't get people to do things; that is again, they advise people to do things, they don't persuade people to do things. This can be seen where Hare says:-

"No one, in seeking to explain the function of indicative sentences, would say that they were attempts to persuade someone that something is the case. And there is no more reason for saying that commands are attempts to persuade or get someone to do something; here, too, we first tell someone what he is to do, and then, if he is not disposed to do what we say, we may start on the wholly different process of trying to get him to do it."

(L.M. I.1.7. Para 2 pp 13&14)

Although our analysis of commending is not complete for no philosophical analysis can, in principle even, ever be, it may be regarded as so, for this is as far as Hare takes it. The key terms of the analysis we have arrived at are not directly, or not at all discussed by Hare. For example, he does not discuss the proper nature of assent in itself, but only ascribes to it certain properties which enable it to be a criterion of imperatives in the way he describes. As thus these terms are not given any special meaning, we must take their meaning to be that they possess in ordinary discourse.

In the course of this analysis we encountered no reference to meaning or to conceptual meaning nor any term or terms which indicate that commending must be, of its very nature, part of the conceptual meaning, or essentially part of the meaning of 'good'. Therefore we may see that Hare's argument against naturalism in chapter five of the *Language of Morals*, is, as it stands, wrong. Let me make this clearer. Hare's objection to naturalism is, essentially, that because of the fact that the word 'good' is sometimes used to commend, a theory of its conceptual meaning which fails to include its commending propensity must be inadequate. However this assumes that the commending propensity must be part of the conceptual meaning. Commending must be a part of the conceptual meaning only in so far as if it is not it is no longer commending, that is only in so far as it is necessary that commending belong to the conceptual meaning of the word used to commend for it to discharge its essential function. Hare's objection fails, although he may maintain elsewhere that commending must be part of the conceptual meaning of 'good', not only would the truth of the above considerations show him to be wrong, but also, since they follow from his own view of the nature of commending, would show him to be involved in a contradiction. Nevertheless we have uncovered material which shows what Hare's main objection to naturalism must be, and which, perhaps, he meant to frame in chapter five.

He must say that the naturalist can't even account for the commending use of 'good' as a non-conceptual or contingent part of its meaning because contingent meanings that a word has must follow in some way from its conceptual meaning but as we saw, the naturalist analyses the conceptual meaning of 'good' solely in terms of indicative sentences, while a commending usage, in so far as it is action guiding, must contain some imperatives, and imperatives cannot follow from indicatives.

Hare himself doesn't make, or even mention, any assumption to the effect that the contingent meaning that a word has in a certain circumstance must follow from its conceptual meaning, however, it is necessary to make it for him, because otherwise we are going to get no further with his objections to naturalism than a discussion of whether or not commendation must be a part of the conceptual meaning of good - which is a question I haven't space to deal with here, for although it is, perhaps, an important question, there are other important questions that ought to be dealt with first as we shall see. Moreover this assumption may be briefly justified thus: although there are problematic cases, as for example when "The birds are flying high today" means "Hello I am your secret agent contact" on the whole it seems not unreasonable to say that the contingent meaning of a word springs from an interaction

of its conceptual meaning with its contingent context; if it doesn't spring from the conceptual meaning in this way, one wonders what else it could spring from.

The argument against naturalism sketched above, makes use of two assertions whose truth is not clear. They are that a commending usage, to be action-guiding, must contain imperatives and that imperatives cannot follow from solely indicative premisses. Let us examine them more closely.

II

An evaluative statement guides action because it contains imperatives and imperatives themselves guide action. If something else other than imperatives guided action too then a commending usage, to be action-guiding, need not contain imperatives for it might contain this something else instead. We have seen already that the relation imperatives have to action is that they advise or tell people to do things. So the question we must ask is: "Can indicatives tell people to do things, in the technical sense of "tell" in question?"

Before we can answer this, we must find out what telling someone to do something is. It is saying something to affect the hearer's behaviour. But so is 'getting' or persuading, what distinguishes telling from these latter? Hare says several things about this, but the important ones seem to be these two:-

"I can say 'I advised him (or ordered him) to pick up his rifle, but he wouldn't'; but 'persuaded' or 'induced' cannot be substituted. It would be self-contradictory to say 'I persuaded him but he wouldn't'"

(R M Hare, 'Freedom of the Will' P.A.S. Suppl.

Vol XXV (1951) P 207 last para)

"It seems to me that all these differences between the two groups of words (advising and persuasion words) are

traceable to the same source; but I find myself unable to characterise this source more precisely than by saying that it has something to do with the freedom, as rational agent of the person addressed."

('Freedom of the Will' P 209 last para)

In the first of these, Hare is drawing attention to the fact that the doing of that action is not necessary to my telling someone to do a certain action, while the doing of the action is necessary to my persuading someone to do that action. In the second Hare must have in mind a distinction of the kind that when I tell someone to do something and he does it, he does it freely, while when I persuade someone to do something, he does not do it freely.

Although Hare discusses the acknowledged ability of indicative sentences to causally bring about behaviour, he doesn't have much to say explicitly about whether indicatives can tell people to do things in the sense explained. We must presume that he thinks they can't, for that is what is consistent with his other beliefs. So let us undertake an independent investigation.

We have to decide three things: whether an indicative sentence can be used to affect behaviour (I use 'affect' and 'modify to cover both cases of 'getting someone to do something' and 'telling someone to do something'); whether it can be

used with the intention of doing so such that if the person to whom it is addressed doesn't do the desired action, the intention is still fulfilled; whether if the person to whom it is addressed does do the desired action, he does so freely.

1 Hare thinks that indicative sentences can be used to affect action, as we can see by this:-

"We may often persuade or induce someone to do something by making a factual assertion; for example, we may induce him to run out into the street by saying 'The house is on fire'."

('Freedom of the Will' p 212 para 2)

If we can establish that the hearing of an indicative sentence can modify a person's behaviour from what it otherwise would have been, it will be easy to see that someone could learn the systematic connection, whatever that may be, between the utterance of certain indicative sentences and certain behavioural manifestations and so be able to use indicative sentences to modify other people's behaviour. A man who has a desire not to be burnt to death

and a weaker desire to stay in the building, if he does not hear and believe that the building is on fire, he will stay in the building, but if he does hear and believe that the building is on fire, he will leave it. This shows that the utterance of indicative sentences can modify behaviour. Hence they also can be used to modify behaviour.

2 What is the intention characteristic of the action of telling someone to do something; that is the intention such that it can be fulfilled even if the person told doesn't do what he is told? Let us examine it in its paradigm employment, in the imperative sentence. In the case of "shut the door", the intention cannot be that the person addressed shut the door, for if he doesn't shut it, the intention is not fulfilled. Also, if this were the intention then the uttering of "shut the door" would be described as shutting the door or at least, as the attempt to shut the door. Having reasoned from intention to description, let us now reason the other way round. As the uttering of "shut the door" is in fact described as telling someone to shut the door, the intention it carried must be simply that someone be told to shut the door.

Whether or not he actually shuts it is entirely up to him (although if he doesn't be better look out, perhaps). To be told to shut the door is to have "shut the door" addressed to you and to understand what the speaker says (and that he means it, too, possibly), though this may only be true of the technical sense of 'tell' under discussion. What the speaker says when he utters an imperative is different in the way we saw above from what he says when he utters an indicative. Hence to understand what someone says when he utters "shut the door" we have to understand that if we assent to what he says we are logically committed to performing an action; in this case shutting the door. So we can see that the intention behind the uttering of an imperative is to get the hearer to understand that if he assents to what is uttered there is a certain action he is logically committed to. This intention may be fulfilled independently of whether the hearer actually does or doesn't do that action because after having understood he still may or may not assent.

So now we must ask whether indicative sentences can carry the sort of intention arrived at above. If a man has a strong desire not to be burnt to death and he is in a building, and if he hears that the building is on fire, then if he assents to that proposition, he is logically committed to take a certain action, namely fire evading action. Our example could be specified in enough detail to make the fire evading actions open to him limited so

that to assent to the proposition "The building is on fire" would logically commit him to running out into the street.

If someone else knew what the man's desire was, and knew the circumstances, he could utter "The building is on fire" to get the man to understand it such that he understands that if he assents to it he is logically committed to running out into the street. Whether the man runs out or not doesn't prevent the intention being fulfilled, for he may not assent to it, or he may abandon his desire, and then assent to it. Thus indicative sentences may have the second essential characteristic of telling.

As Hare saw, this characteristic is dependent on the third characteristic in some way. So let us consider the third before considering possible objections to what I say. The way the second characteristic is dependent on the third can be seen from what follows. We might think that "shut the door" carried the intention that the door be shut. But as we have seen, to utter "shut the door" with this intention would be to discountenance the possibility that the result of commanding "shut the door" could well be other than the door's being shut. This means the hearer would be simply regarded as a causal link in the chain which terminates with the shutting of the door. In Kantian terminology, the hearer would be regarded solely as a means not as an end in himself. In

short, he would not be regarded as free. To respect the hearer's free will the speaker must have an intention which stops short of intending that the hearer act in a certain way. The course the hearer eventually takes must be left entirely up to him. Thus to respect the hearer's free will an imperative must carry an intention whose fulfilling is independent of the action the hearer takes. This is why if in telling someone to do something one seeks to regard him as free, one must have the kind of intention comprising characteristic 2.

3 When action is brought about by indicative sentences, can the agent ever be said to be free? The simplest way of answering this is by considering our example. When a man runs out into the street as a result of hearing that the building is on fire, would we say that his action was free? We would.

His action is free in two ways. Firstly, when he hears the cry "The building is on fire", he has to decide whether it is a genuine alarm or just some practical joker. In so far as we can decide whether to believe things or not, belief in something is freely entered into. Secondly, having assented to "the building is on fire", he is then logically constrained by his desire to leave the building. By 'logically constrained by his desire' I mean that he cannot

on the one hand assent to "The building is on fire" and not leave the building and at the same time, on the other hand, have the desire not to be burnt. His assenting to "The building is on fire" but not leaving it is a sufficient condition for our saying that he does not have the desire in question. However, the possession of a certain desire is something which is under the control of the will, so the acceptance of the desire not to be burnt in this case is a free act. Thus we may say that the man, having freely desired and freely assented, is then logically constrained to leave the building.

It might be doubted whether desiring is a free activity, for it may be said that we simply just have the desires we do in the same way as we simply just have the body we do, and that the only explanations of why we have them must be scientific causal ones. However, there are two ways in which a desire may be present to the mind. It may be active, that is, it may control the person's behaviour such that when a suitable set of conditions obtain it necessitates action, or it may be repressed, that is, a person may be only too aware of a desire, but he resists it and prevents it from governing his action, even when the conditions are suitable for its end to be attained. That this is so is a fact of common experience. Whether a desire is present to the mind is not under the

control of the will, but whether it is active or repressed is, although making and keeping a desire repressed is one of the hardest jobs the will has to face and one in which it slips up quite frequently. Now there is a common sense of the word desire in which it refers only to active desires. Thus the suicide case is said to desire not to live although he undoubtedly has a desire to live, and the ascetic is said to desire no food though all men desire food. It is just that the suicide and the ascetic resist and overcome their desires to live and to eat. When I say desire is free, I am using it in this sense. When the objector says desire is not free he is using it in a more general sense which takes no notice of activity or repression. The two views are not inconsistent. They are both right.

It might be wondered whether it is really fair to call shouting to someone that the building is on fire, telling him to do something, namely leave the building. "The building is on fire" contains no imperative neustic, as Hare calls it, to indicate that the speaker wishes a certain state of affairs brought about, and contains no description of the state of affairs it is said to be telling him to bring about. If one person shouting that sentence were said to be telling another person anything, he would be said to be telling him the descriptive fact that the building is on fire. This is quite true, however it doesn't

show that "The building is on fire" cannot tell someone to do something, in Hare's technical sense of "tell" elucidated above; rather it shows that Hare's term is not very satisfactory for characterising the category of things he subsumes under it.

But what's wrong with explaining the example we are considering by saying that Jones told Smith a purely factual piece of information (that the building was on fire) in the light of which Smith made up his own mind to run in to the street? If I read that the banks of some Cornish streams are abundant in uranium ore, I might decide next time I go to Cornwall to make a close search on the banks of one of its streams, but that doesn't mean that the author of the book was telling me that next time I go to Cornwall I should make a close search of the banks of one of its streams. What's wrong with the proffered explanation, and why the fire example is different from the uranium ore example, lies in the intentions of the speaker. Jones doesn't think he is telling Smith an interesting general knowledge fact which he can deal with as he likes, his intention is not to simply inform, it is to see Smith out of the building. Conversely the author of the geological book doesn't have the intention that I should make a search of a certain stream in Cornwall, rather his intention is simply to inform.

This should not be taken to mean that when Jones performs the action of telling Smith to leave the building (by means of saying "The building is on fire") that the intention which appertains to it is that Smith should leave the building. As we have already seen, this would be incompatible with telling-someone-to-do-something. However that does not mean that Jones cannot have another, ulterior, intention to bring about Smith's exit from the building, and for which the action of telling Smith (with its corresponding limited intention merely to tell Smith something) serves as a means of fulfilment. Thus Jones's saying to Smith "The building is on fire" can be counted as telling Smith to leave the building insofar as saying it has the intention merely to tell Smith something, and can be seen not to be merely informative insofar as its utterance is the fulfilment of the ulterior intention to bring about a certain state of affairs, namely Smith's exit.

But what's wrong with explaining Jones's utterance and intention by saying that Jones told Smith a purely factual piece of knowledge accompanied by certain hopes and fears as he did so, say the hope that Smith would leave the building and the fear that Smith would be burnt? What's wrong with this explanation is it doesn't account for the fact that Jones's desire that Smith run into the street is implemented by his shouting the building is on fire. What

I mean by 'implemented' is that shouting that the building is on fire, in those circumstances, is the action which Jones's failure to do would provide us with conclusive evidence for saying that he didn't have the desire that Smith leave the building. Jones's first concern is that Smith should come into the street, he decides the best way of bringing this about is, by informing Smith that the building is on fire, although something else would have done if that way hadn't promised to be efficacious. If Jones hadn't desired that Smith do something, namely come into the street, he wouldn't have informed him of anything.

It is this fact that the *raison d'être* of indicative statements like "The building is on fire", in certain contexts, is their action-guiding capacity, which means that although perhaps, properly speaking, they don't tell someone to do something, they can in certain respects be classed with imperatives in a way which is what Hare means by "tell" here.

However, it might still be said that although it is true, and indeed obvious, that indicative sentences may be action-guiding in this way, nevertheless the indicative sentence is not in itself action-guiding in the way that an imperative sentence is. Although the indicative sentence is necessary for Jones's guiding Smith, it is not sufficient. If Jones hadn't said "The building is on fire" then he

wouldn't have communicated anything to Smith; wouldn't have done anything to affect Smith's behaviour. If Smith hadn't had the desire not to be burnt then Jones couldn't have known that he had it and hence couldn't have had the sort of intention which we saw above was a necessary component of telling someone to do something, thus Smith's desire is also a necessary condition for "The building is on fire" to be action-guiding. As we can conceive of the utterance "The building is on fire" without Smith's having the desire that he does; as we can conceive of the utterance of any indicative sentence in the absence of any desires whatever, we may see that indicative sentences are not action-guiding.

But we cannot conceive of the utterance of any indicative sentence in the absence of any desires. As we shall see later, it follows from the fact that we speak the way we do that human nature is such that there are some desires which we simply just do have, have all the time, and which we simply just will fulfil, given the chance in exactly the same way as a raised stone, if released, will fall to the ground given the chance. We cannot conceive of human nature without such desires, since any nature which lacked them would not be human. It is these desires which motivate life and hence discourse. It is by examining the way we speak that their existence may be deduced. Hence the uttering of any indicative sentence entails desires of this sort. In this case, any purely indicative sentence whose

content was such that when taken together with one or more of these desires it entails it served to guide action, would be essentially action-guiding.

III

Let us now consider the question of whether imperatives can be derived from indicatives. Hare discusses several ways in which such a derivation might be supposed possible.

"The first does this by representing them (imperatives) as expressing statements about the mind of the speaker. Just as it has been held that 'A is right' means 'I approve of A', so it might be held that 'shut the door' means 'I want you to shut the door'."

(L.M. I.1.3 para 1 p 5)

It should be noticed that this theory as Hare gives it characterises imperatives in two quite different ways and hence must equate the two kinds of thing involved. (What I mean by this may be seen by what follows.) The theory must consequently be seen as making three assertions: 1 "shut the door" is a statement about the mind of the speaker; 2 "shut the door" may be translated into "I want you to shut the door", and therefore 3 "I want you to ..." is a statement about the mind of the speaker.

Hare criticises this theory by pointing out:-

"It has the consequence that if I say "shut the door" and you say (to the same person) "Do not shut the door", we

are not contradicting each other; and this is odd."

(L.M. I.1.3 pp 5-6)

It is odd because we normally do feel that imperatives can contradict each other. He criticises the theory again by saying:-

"But there remains the difficulty that the sentence "shut the door" seems to be about shutting the door and not about the speaker's frame of mind, just as instructions for cooking omelets ('Take four eggs, etc.') are instructions about eggs, not introspective analyses of the psyche of Mrs Beeton."

(L.M. I.1.3. p 6)

Both these criticisms are efficacious and unconditional rebuttals of 1, but they are rebuttals of 2 only on the condition that 3 is true while conversely they will show 3 to be false if 2 is true. Thus the question of whether imperatives can be analysed into indicative 'want' statements devolves to the question of whether 3 is true.

"I want you to shut the door" is not, at least not wholly, about my state of mind. We get some inkling of this from seeing that we intuitively do consider A's wanting C to shut the door and B's wanting him not to shut it, not only to conflict but to contradict. A's wanting the apple

on the table entails that, all other things being equal, A will take the apple, while B's wanting it entails that he will take it. B's taking the apple entails A's not taking it. Here we have contradiction of the sort that if B wants the apple, and all other things are equal for him, then it follows either that A does not want the apple or all other things are not equal for him. B's taking the apple serves to make other things not equal for A, and vice versa. Although this is a pretty etiolated form of contradiction it is enough to show that "I want .." statements, because they can contradict, are not simply about the speaker's state of mind.

Hare himself argues the same point:-

" 'I believe that you are going to shut the door' is not (except in a highly figurative way) a statement about my mind: it is a tentative statement about your shutting the door, a more hesitant version of 'You are going to shut the door'; and similarly, 'I want you to shut the door' is not a statement about my mind but a polite way of saying the imperative 'shut the door'. Unless we understand the logic of 'You are going to shut the door', we cannot understand the logic of 'I believe that you are going to shut the door'; and similarly unless we understand 'shut the door' we are unlikely to understand 'I want you to shut the door'."

(L.M. I.1.3 p 6)

This would be strange since it would detract from his own position did it not at the same time offer fresh grounds for believing it impossible to derive imperatives from "I want" statements. The new grounds have no force in themselves because what he says could well be true even if "I want .." statements were the correct analyses of imperatives. The analysans entails the analysandum, and entailment is a sort of implication and we often tell somebody something in a polite way not by telling him that something but by telling him another thing which implies it. Again, we cannot understand the logic of 'x is a figure with four straight equal length sides' unless we understand the logic of 'x is a square'. If it be held that more generally speaking Hare's view of the nature of wanting entails the falsity of 2: this view is dealt with and rejected below. It seems to me that Hare's views of the nature of wanting may be a consequence of his view that imperatives cannot be derived from indicatives, why else would he maintain such an unlikely position as that "I want....." statements are a tentative, polite, form of imperatives? In this case the view could not be used to show that imperatives do not follow from indicatives in the first place.

The second theory about the derivability of imperatives from indicatives is that of H G Bohnert,

which Hare puts thus:-

"This interesting suggestion may be summarised (I hope without injustice) by the statement that 'shut the door' means the same as 'Either you are going to shut the door, or x will happen, where x is understood to be something bad for the person addressed.'"

(L.M. I.1.4 para 1 p 7)

Hare's two criticisms of this emerge in the following passage:-

"But in cases where the end aimed at is not so easily recognised (the imperative being only to a small degree, or not at all 'hypothetical') the hearer may be quite at a loss to understand on this analysis, what he is to supply after the word 'or'. It is very difficult to see how a sentence like 'Please tell your father that I called' would be analysed on Bohnert's theory. It is, of course, always possible to terminate the analysis 'or something bad will happen'; but this expedient succeeds only by reintroducing into the analysis a prescriptive word; for 'bad' is a value word and therefore prescriptive."

(L.M. I.1.4. para 1 pp 7 & 8)

If the first criticism depends solely on the producing of an imperative unanalysable in Bohnertian terms, then all we have to do is give such an analysis of it, and

the objection will fail. It seems to me that 'Please tell your father that I called' may be fairly easily and naturally translated into something like 'Either you tell your father that I called, or when I next see him and he finds out I called but you didn't tell him, he is liable to become extremely annoyed, and you will feel the consequences.' If the first criticism depends on all non-hypothetical imperatives being unanalysable in Bohnertian terms, then since we have shown that one such imperative is so analysable, we have shown that all are in principle.

The second criticism has no force because proving that imperatives are not derivable from indicatives is an essential part of Hare's proof of prescriptivism, for if the entailing of imperatives, and hence commending could be performed by a solely descriptive meaning of the word good, there would be no need to introduce an extra, separate, prescriptive meaning for this. To use a conclusion of the proof of prescriptivism (as the assertion that 'bad' is a prescriptive word, is) in order to demonstrate a step within that proof is to beg the question.

Hare points out that there is one sort of imperative which does follow from solely indicative premisses; the hypothetical imperative:-

"I have already warned the reader, there is one kind of imperative conclusion which can be entailed by a

set of purely indicative premisses. This is the so-called 'hypothetical' imperative Consider the following sentence: If you want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford, go to Grimbly Hughes. This seems to follow from, and say no more than: Grimbly Hughes is the largest grocer in Oxford."

(L.M. I.3.2. para 1 pp 33-34)

This doesn't matter for his purposes. His purposes are to show that the action guiding propensity of words demands a special kind of nondescriptive meaning, and to show that purely descriptive statements can't be action guiding. This last he achieves by showing that action guiding is performed by imperatives and that imperatives can't follow from indicative descriptive premisses. Although hypothetical imperatives do follow from indicatives, they are not action-guiding, so Hare's claim that purely descriptive statements cannot be action guiding, is not threatened. Hypothetical imperatives are not action-guiding because they say: if a certain condition is fulfilled - act, one isn't enjoined by them to take action until such time as the condition is fulfilled. As they don't say whether the condition they stipulate is fulfilled, or ever will be, they don't tell you to act, now, or at sometime in the future.

However, as Hare himself tells us the derivation of a

hypothetical sentence from its premiss can be rewritten by making the premiss the minor premiss of a syllogism, subtracting the protasis of the hypothetical and making it the major premiss, from these two what was the apodosis of the hypothetical will syllogistically follow. So you might think that Hare's example could be rewritten as:-

You want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford.

Grimbly Hughes is the largest grocer in Oxford.

Go to Grimbly Hughes.

In this case we would have a fully fledged action guiding imperative following from two indicative premisses.

Hare is able to avoid this conclusion because of his view of the correct analysis of the word 'want' in "If you want to go to the largest grocer, etc.". This view is shown here:-

"'Want' is here a logical term, and stands, as we shall see, for an imperative inside a subordinate clause."

(L.M. I.3.2. para 2 p 34)

He is then able to analyse the example, not as above, but like this:-

"Go to the largest grocer in Oxford.

Grimbly Hughes is the largest grocer in Oxford.

Go to Grimbly Hughes."

(L.M. I.3.2. para 2 p 35)

Let us consider this view of the analysis of 'want'. First, how are we going to conceive of an imperative inside a subordinate conditional clause. If we attempt to analyse such an imperative (let us give it as "If go to the largest grocer in Oxford ..." for the time being) along Harean lines, where are we to put the 'if', in the neustic or the phrastic? If the phrastic, we get something like this "If your going to the largest grocer in Oxford: please", that is we are indicating that we wish him to bring about the state of affairs of his going etc. but the only kind of state of affairs that could conceivably be is a state of affairs such that if he is going to the largest grocer in Oxford, he should go to Grimbly Hughes. Thus in the case where Grimbly Hughes is the largest grocer, we are asking him to do nothing at all, and in the case where Grimbly Hughes is not the largest grocer we are asking him to add an extension to the grocery, or something. If 'if' is on the neustic as is more likely, then we get something like this: "Your going to the largest grocer in Oxford: if please, then please: your going to Grimbly Hughes. (If the 'if' and the 'then' are not in the same kind of part then the whole becomes unintelligible.) We see some justification for Hare's thinking that "If go" is translatable into "If you want to go" here, for "If please" looks very much as if what it means is "If you please", which is more or less the same as "If you want". But it would be a mistake to rewrite "If please" in this way, for the "please" of an imperative

neustic 'belongs' to the speaker and not to the hearer, rather it should be rewritten "If I please". Consequently the meaning of "If go to the largest grocer in Oxford then go to Grimbly Hughes" should be seen as "If I order you to go to the largest grocer in Oxford, then go to Grimbly Hughes." - the "If I order you" formula would be the way, if any, to represent an imperative inside a subordinate conditional clause.

This whole discussion is unduly complicated by the fact that "please" is a short form of "if you please". For even 'pleases' which 'belong' to me I may express by saying "If you please" as well as 'pleases' that 'belong' to you. But when I use "If you please" in these two different ways, it has a radically different sense. In the latter, it has its literal sense as seen in: "O, all right, go if you please, don't if you don't, it's all the same to me", while in the former it has its commoner performative sense as seen in: "Will you stop doing that if you please!". The logical anatomy of "please" is too large a question to be embarked upon here beyond a brief characterisation. When I say "If you please" belonging to you it means "If it pleases you" when I say "If you please" belonging to me, it means "It would please me if ...".

But "If I order you to go to the largest grocer .." couldn't have any effect upon action since to say "If I

order" is not to order, so even if it could be assented to, which is dubious, assent would not entail the intention to perform an action. As we saw above nothing which lacks at least the latter of these properties can be an imperative. So it is impossible to have an imperative in a subordinate conditional clause. The same would hold even if the analysis of "If go" were "If you want to go".

This indicates that there must be something wrong with the argumentation Hare uses to support the conclusion that 'want' serves to indicate an imperative in a subordinate clause, when it occurs in contexts like the above. He says:-

"The first matter that requires elucidation is the status of the word 'want'. It does not mean the same as 'be affected by a recognisable state of the feelings known as desire'. If I were the superior of a religious order whose rule ordained the complete abnegation of desires, I could not say to a novice 'If you have a desire to go to the largest grocer in Oxford, go to Grimbly Hughes'; for this would be contrary to the rule. But I might very well say 'If you want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford, go to Grimbly Hughes'; for this would simply be intended to convey a piece of information that the largest grocer is Grimbly Hughes."

(L.M. I.3.2. p 34)

The desires whose abnegation the religious life demands are those springing from the body (where 'body' includes all the faculties of mind except for reason), from man considered as an animal. But because 'want' needn't stand for such desires, it does not then follow that the only other role left to it is to be a logical device of the kind suggested. There is another kind of want, namely those springing from the reason, from man considered as transcendent entity, and the word 'desire' may be applied to these no less legitimately than to the other.

To make this kind of rational desire clearer let us take an example. All men do not wish to commit suicide by starvation desire to eat, even monks (the fact that they so desire is entailed by the fact that they do eat). But whereas some men eat according to the dictates of desire, some eat according to the dictates of reason. To do the former is to eat from a fondness for certain bodily sensations. To do the latter is to eat simply, say, to keep the metabolism alive and in healthy working order. This would seem to indicate that while bodily desires are desires for ends in themselves, rational desires are desires for ends which the reason tells us are the best means for achieving certain further ends. But in that case the scheming lecher in hatching a scheme would be acting out of rational desire permissible by a

religious order, while a monk when desiring the ultimate end in itself which his eating is a means to (i.e. something like greater communion with God) would be said to be giving way to a bodily, impermissible desire.

As this seems unlikely the difference between rational and bodily desires must be sought in the kind of end towards which they are directed. This means we must be able to distinguish between rational and bodily ultimate ends. It seems we can. A rational ultimate end would be one which the reason had decided was the ultimate good. A bodily ultimate end would be one towards which one's irrational nature tended to drive one.

Let us pass over the many thorny problems that arise from this (as for example that such a definition would allow a genuinely depraved hedonist who acted thus out of intellectual conviction to be acting in accordance with religiously permissible rational desire) and content ourselves with seeing the kind of thing rational desire might be.

At any rate insofar as such an account of rational desire means that the reason may say that communion with God (or whatever) is the ultimate good, it allows such desires to be compatible with the religious life. So a

religious superior could very well say "If you want etc." meaning "want" in this sense.

Further it is a consequence of Hare's view that "If you want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford, go to Grimbly Hughes" would be simply intended to convey the information that Grimbly Hughes is the largest. It is a consequence of my view that it would convey something more than that. It seems very unlikely that by saying "If you want ... Grimbly Hughes" we just convey what Hare says we do. It seems very unlikely that if we wanted to tell someone, simply, that Grimbly Hughes was the largest grocer, we would do it by saying "If you want ... Grimbly Hughes". It seems very likely that what we would convey to someone by saying this to them would be: "You will probably find at some time in the future that you want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford. Grimbly Hughes is the largest, so go there." If one did say "If you want ... Grimbly Hughes" solely to convey that Grimbly Hughes was the largest grocer in Oxford, one could be accused of being very, wantonly, or even deliberately, misleading.

After this argument Hare says: "... 'want' is here a logical term, and stands, as we shall see, for an imperative inside a subordinate clause", this implies that more argument is forthcoming, but none appears before the analysis of our example in this way. However after the

analysis quoted on p 32 Hare continues:-

"It then becomes:

Grimbly Hughes is the largest grocer in Oxford.

If go to the largest grocer in Oxford, go to
Grimbly Hughes.

In English, we write this conclusion in the form:

If you want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford
go to Grimbly Hughes."

(L.M. I.3.2. para 3 p 35)

We may count this as an argument for the analysis of 'want' discussed. It says that it is not grammatically correct to precede an imperative sentence with 'if' and the natural and correct grammatical thing to change it to is "If you want to ...". This argument draws strength from the fact that placing indicative sentences after 'if' frequently means they must be modified; eg "I am going" becomes "If I go" "I was going" may become "If I were going" etc. But, this change of indicatives to the subjunctive is nothing like the transformation of "Go" to "If you want to go" either in degree or kind. In degree, because the complete rewording of "go" to "If you want to go" is much more radical than a mere retensing of the verb. In kind, because the change doesn't serve to indicate a certain amount of doubt about whether the state of affairs described is as described, in the way the subjunctive does. Indicative sentences may perfectly grammatically remain

unchanged after 'if' eg "I am going" may become "If I am going" and "I was going" may become "If I was going" whereas "If go" is gibberish. "If go" has an ungrammatical look about it, admittedly, but this is because we tend to read it as the pidgin English for "If I go" or "If I'm going". If we take care to eliminate this tendency is it still ungrammatical? It's hard to tell, why should it be? If we meant "If go" surely we would say "If go". The fact that we never do say it is better explained by my conclusion above that an imperative sentence in a subordinate conditional clause is an impossibility, than by saying it's just not grammatically well-formed.

These considerations lead us to doubt whether "If you want to" may be analysed in terms of an imperative. Thus we may conclude that the imperative "Go to Grimbly Hughes" can be derived from the two indicative sentences: "You want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford" and "Grimbly Hughes is the largest grocer in Oxford". But it may be urged that although "You want to etc." is not imperative, it is not really indicative either, or that it is a very special case of indicative such that the conclusion that imperatives are derivable from indicatives of this sort is not damaging to Hare's position.

To find out whether this is the case we have to examine the key word in such sentences, 'want', and see

what it is about it that enables it to entail imperatives. As was mentioned in a round-about way above, there are external criteria for wanting. If someone says that he wants to go to the station and suitable physical and psychological circumstances arise for him to go there, but he doesn't go, then we are prepared to say of him that he doesn't want to go to the station, after all, and that either he was mistaken, or was lying, or has changed his mind.

It might be thought that these outward criteria were sufficient as well as necessary to attribute wanting to someone, because we can't do any action without wanting to do it. If we want to go to the butcher's and that involves passing the station then we wanted to go to the station. As Hare quotes Kant: he who wills the end wills the means. Compare "How do I get to Trafalgar Square?", "Oh you want the Piccadilly Line". However if these criteria were sufficient, then to say of anybody that he wanted to do something would simply be to say that he would do that thing, in certain circumstances, and that person's realisation that he wanted to do something would amount to no more than realising that he would do something. There would be no indication of why or for what purpose he would do that action - no trying to attain or avoid anything. Action would have to be regarded as no more meaningful than

the twitchings of a compulsive tic - would have to be regarded as a random by-product of an organic system. Furthermore such purposelessness would make actions unpredictable from a teleological point of view, so neither the person himself nor another would have any grounds for attributing wanting to him except purely scientific ones of previously observed constant conjunction.

To avoid such consequences we must also make some purpose an essential part of wanting, so that a person wants what he does because he is aware this is the way to attain his purpose. This purpose may be another action, eg I went to the station to buy a ticket, or a thing, eg I went to the station for a ticket. But it would be natural to also express these as "I went to the station because I wanted to buy a ticket", and, "I went to the station because I wanted a ticket". You can't want to do a thing for a certain purpose unless you want that purpose. The concept of purpose entails that the action or thing which is the purpose is wanted. If I said "I went to the station to buy a ticket" a perfectly acceptable response would be "What do you want to buy a ticket for?" But from what we saw above it follows that you can't want the thing or action which is the purpose unless there is another further purpose which is an essential component of that wanting which is an essential component of the first purpose which is an essential component of the first wanting.

This seems as if it might go on ad infinitum, but if it did we could never have a want because the purpose essential to it would be missing because the want essential to that is missing etc. etc. As it would be impossible for us ever to come to the end of the chain, it would be impossible for us ever to complete the logical requirements of wanting. However, as we undeniably do want, there necessarily must be an end to the chain. We must postulate some ultimate purposes which are not wanted for some further purpose, but simply in themselves.

These ultimate purposes must be wanted all the time or else the mere scientific predictability of their occurrence would be passed on down the line to all the actions done to attain them, which would not be compatible with how we use wanting language.

Though it is not clear that wanting and action language necessitate there only being one such ultimate purpose, we can't have more than a few before consequences clearly at variance with the way we use wanting and action language follow. For the number of actions which we are prepared to admit may be purposeless and are wanted only for their own sake is very small. Some philosophers have held that moral actions are ultimate actions done for no purpose but their own sake. Some philosophers have held

that pleasure is an ultimate end sought for no purpose, but its own sake. These are not necessarily incompatible.

However if we make purpose essential to wanting, then we cannot speak of wanting these ultimate ends, for they are purposeless. I have done because it's difficult to see what other word to use, and one can make such a use of 'wanting' formally correct by the expedient of saying: we want such ultimate ends for their own sake. But it is important to realise that this phrase "for their own sake" is an empty formal requirement demanded by the use of teleological language about such ends. To say 'I want x for its own sake' is to say no more than 'I want x because I seek x'. But this is not like 'I want the kingship because I seek power'. This latter is translatable into 'I seek the kingship because I seek something, and that something is power', this is a perfectly reasonable synthetic informative sentence. But 'I seek x because I seek something, namely x' is to say the same as 'I seek x because I seek x', which is a tautology of the emptiest kind like 'If p is true then p is true', it says simply that I seek x.

In 'I want the kingship because I seek power' some explanation is being given of why I seek the kingship. But in 'I want x for its own sake' no explanation is being given of why we seek x, as we have seen, unless we count 'I seek

x because I do' as an explanation. And this is right for when we come to the ultimate ends of action, teleological explanation of behaviour breaks down and we simply have to accept that our ultimate ends are what they are as a matter of empirical fact, inexplicable by philosophy though perhaps eminently explicable by science. Philosophy must meet the world somewhere, our conceptual frame work is not independent of the sensual continuum it's designed to handle, complete rationalism is impossible. If our ultimate ends are explicable only by science, then we can be as certain that we will take, possess, or do, them, given the chance, as we can that a stone raised up will fall, given the chance. The feature, whatever that may be, belonging to these two phenomena, which gives rise to this sort of certainty, I shall term causal necessity, and from this use of 'necessity' derive a related sense of 'must' so that we may say that we must, as a matter of causal necessity seek the ends that we do.

We are now in a position to see how "You want to go .." can be the kind of thing which could entail an imperative . If you want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford, then you must, as a matter of causal necessity go to the largest grocer in Oxford, and if your reason tells you that Grimbly Hughes is the largest grocer in Oxford, so that the only way you can satisfy your want is by going to Grimbly Hughes, then you must, as a matter of

causal necessity, go to Grimbly Hughes and it is this causal necessity which is represented in the imperative mood of the conclusion. (In this case, one could only have to go to the largest grocer in Oxford in the first place, insofar as reason told one that to do that was the only way of satisfying some ultimate end of the kind discussed above.)

But how would this causal necessity be "represented in the imperative"? We saw above that Hare's criticisms of Bohnert's theory of imperatives were inefficacious. If we attempt a Bohnertian analysis of the "Go to Grimbly Hughes!" of our example, we get something like this:- "Either you go to Grimbly Hughes, or your want of going to the largest grocer in Oxford will be left unsatisfied." The interesting thing about such an analysis is that if the views of wanting discussed above are accepted, then the person in question cannot assent to this proposition without committing himself to an action, which is Hare's criterion of an imperative. This comes about thus: if you have the want to go to the largest grocer in Oxford and you assent to the truth of the above proposition, you causally must assent to the truth of the proposition that you will go to Grimbly Hughes, and if you assent to that you logically must go to Grimbly Hughes. It may be said that causal necessity being what it is, you could refuse to assent to the proposition that you will go to Grimbly Hughes, even while in the process of doing it. But this

has its counterpart in ordering too, for you can refuse to obey an order even while in the process of doing it.

It could be argued that this so-called imperative counterpart is not a true analogue because it is assenting to the imperative utterance itself which commits us to action while in my analysis it is assenting to the sentence "I will do x" which commits us to action and "You will do x" is not part of the sentence "Either you (will) do x, or y will occur" for assenting to the truth of this latter does not logically commit us to action by itself. Since Hare's criterion seems certainly true of imperatives, this would also constitute a good reason for thinking Bohnert's analysis false.

But this is a trivial point and doesn't really matter. We could assimilate the proposition 'You will do x' to the meaning of a proposition like "Either you do x, or you will not satisfy your want" because this latter causes us to entertain the meaning of the former, and the meaning of a set of symbols is the conceptual structure they cause us to entertain. Alternatively we could admit Bohnert's account of imperatives to be wrong, and revise it such that "Do x" may be translated as "You will do x for either you do x or your want will not be satisfied", or perhaps "You will do x. Either you do x or your want will not be satisfied", or something like that.

A more serious criticism would be that such a theory of imperatives, because it depends on a theory of wanting in which the causation of behaviour by unalterable ends plays such a part, excludes free will. But although the ultimate ends are fixed, the ways of achieving them, and hence the intermediate ends, are not. These are decided upon by reason's calculation of the best path for achieving the ultimate end, and freedom consists in the exercise of reason. Thus all actions are free except for those few of seeking the ultimate ends. This allows one to say that for the hedonistic egoist all of the infinite range of actions are free, excepting one: the action of seeking pleasure.

But what about that formidable objection which all theories analysing imperatives in terms of indicatives must face? The one which in this case would run: if "Go to Grimby Hughes!" means "Either you go to Grimby Hughes or your want of going to the largest grocer in Oxford will be left unsatisfied." then if someone ordered us "Go to Grimby Hughes!" we could quite reasonably reply "That's not true but not at all reasonably or intelligibly reply "No! I shan't!". Whereas in actual practice the latter is regarded as being the reasonable reply to an imperative while the former would be regarded as unintelligible.

I suggested above that we might somehow have to incorporate the sentence "You will go to Grimbly Hughes" into the analysis. This would have the result that "No! I shan't!" would become an intelligible response. But this would still leave us with the other problem of truth. In any case, "No! I shan't!" would only then become 'intelligible insofar as it meant "No, that is not true. It is not true that I will.".

If what is uttered when somebody issues an imperative can be neither true nor false then it cannot be, or mean, a description or purported description of the world. But there is nothing to stop it describing, or perhaps depicting would be a better word, a possible state of affairs. Significantly, if we extract from "You will go to Grimbly Hughes" and "Either you go to Grimbly Hughes or ..." the words concerned with depicting a possible state of affairs and leave behind those asserting that that state of affairs actually obtains and those expressing purely logical relations, we get "Go to Grimbly Hughes".

If our analysis of the imperative "Go to Grimbly Hughes" is to be correct, but at the same time all a person is doing when he utters "Go to Grimbly Hughes!" is depicting a possible state of affairs, then the rest of our analysis (that is, minus the depicting of the state of affairs) must be conveyed by the context in which "Go to Grimbly Hughes" is uttered. This context must also be necessary for "Go

to Grimbly Hughes!" to be an imperative. Thus when somebody utters to you "Go to Grimbly Hughes!" (in the situation which has furnished our example) the context conveys that you will do what he says: either you will do what he says or your want of going to the largest grocer will not be satisfied.

In this case the imperative "Go to Grimbly Hughes" cannot be replied to by "That is not true" for only propositions purporting to describe the actual world can be true and a depiction of a possible state of affairs is not such a proposition, and contexts though they may convey things, do not make propositions. On the other hand "No! I shan't " replies as much to what is implicitly conveyed by the context as to what is uttered. Such a reply will be perfectly understood by the speaker insofar as if he has issued a true imperative it's only because the context is as it is that he uttered the words he did in the first place. We could try and put this another way; "No! I shan't!" is not really an answer at all, dependent on a prior assertion in the way "That's not true" is, but is an independent assertion in its own right which gains its relevance to the uttered imperative insofar as it draws its meaning from circumstances which are the essential contextual ingredients of the imperative of which the uttered imperative is the verbal manifestation. However, this whole point strikes me as being so implausible that it casts the gravest doubts upon the theory of imperatives we are considering.

IV

Having examined, in section I Hare's criticism of naturalism we saw that it depended on the belief that indicative sentences could not 'tell' people to act and on the belief that imperative sentences could not be derived from indicative ones. In section II we saw that indicative sentences can be used to tell people to behave in a certain way. In section III we examined and rejected Hare's criticisms of the theory that imperatives may be analysed in terms of 'want' statements and of the theory put forward by H G Bohnert. We then examined Hare's claim that hypothetical imperatives, although they seem to show us a case of imperatives being derived from indicatives, do not do so really. This claim was found to turn on a certain view about how the word 'want' should be analysed which we investigated and rejected. As a result of finding out what wanting really is, we were able to advance a theory about the correct analysis of imperatives which said that they may be analysed into expressions closely similar to those which Bohnert suggests, but of which a 'want' statement is an essential part. Thus our theory, in a way, forms a synthesis of the theories which Hare attacks. This theory not only provides us with an analysans which exhibits the characteristic that Hare uses as the criterion of an imperative, namely the characteristic that assent to it logically commits one to action, but also with an analysans which is indicative. We are thus in a position to see that Hare's criticism of naturalism fails.

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